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Abstract. Conditioning on some set of confounders that causally affect both treat-
ment and outcome variables can be sufficient for eliminating bias introduced by all
such confounders when estimating causal effect of the treatment on the outcome
from observational data. It is done by including them in propensity score model
in so-called potential outcome framework for causal inference whereas in causal
graphical modeling framework usual conditioning on them is done. However in
the former framework, it is confusing when modeler finds a variable that is non-
causally associated with both the treatment and the outcome. Some argue that such
variables should also be included in the analysis for removing bias. But others ar-
gue that they introduce no bias so they should be excluded and conditioning on
them introduces spurious dependence between the treatment and the outcome, thus
resulting extra bias in the estimation. We show that there may be errors in both
the arguments in different contexts. When such a variable is found neither of the
actions may give the correct causal effect estimate. Selecting one action over the
other is needed in order to be less wrong. We discuss how to select the better action.
Keywords. causal effect estimation, confounder selection, graphical models.
1. Introduction
For making causal inferences from observational data (see [1] and [2]) it is important to
find, ideally all the potential pretreatment confounders of the given causal relation be-
tween the cause (treatment variable) and the effect (outcome variable), in order to obtain
unbiased causal effect estimate of the former on the latter. Let Z denote the treatment re-
ceived by subjects, taking values from the set Z = {0,1} and let Y denote the outcome,
taking values from the set Y = {0,1} where 0 denotes failure and 1 denotes success. In
potential outcome causal model [1] it is accepted existence of pair of potential outcomes
(Y1,Y0) for each subject, where Yi is the outcome that would have been observed had the
treatment been Z = i for i = 0,1. It is assumed that the pair is independent of the treat-
ment assignment, written as (Y0,Y1)⊥Z when the treatment assignments are randomized
as in case of a randomized experiment. However in observational studies, the treatment
assignments are not randomized. Then, useful assumption for causal inference is that the
potential outcomes are conditionally independent of the treatment assignment given the
pretreatment covariates, say, multivariate X . Ideally, X denotes ’all’ the potential pre-
treatment confounders of Z and Y and then it is written as (Y1,Y2)⊥Z | X . That is, to
estimate the causal effect of Z on Y , we need to condition on (control for) X . However,
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it is not necessary to consider all the pretreatment confounders but any ’sufficient’ sub-
set of them. Finding such a sufficient set of condounders is somewhat problematic and
the potential outcome framework offers no clear way to do it. However, causal graphi-
cal modeling framework [2] offers one way that is called ’back door criterion’. It shows
how to choose a subset of covariates in order to identify the causal effect (to estimate it
without bias). When a causal graphical model is identified on Z, Y and all their causal
factors the criterion can find a sufficient subset and such a set is called an ’admissible’ or
a ’deconfounding’ set in the literature. Considering some covariates as confounders by
ignoring such a criterion can sometimes introduce further bias (p. 351 of [2]). However,
the back-door criterion is not complete [2]; there exist causal graphical models where
the criterion fails for some sets of covariates though adjusting for them results in valid
causal effect estimates.
So, the problem of confounder selection is important in casual inference. In the po-
tential outcome causal model, when the analyst has found all the confounders then he/she
uses them either directly or indirectly (in so-called propensity score models [3], [4]) for
removing induced bias from them. However, any factor that is causing both the treatment
and the outcome could be identified relatively easily as pretreatment confounders with
subject domain knowledge. For that it is important to decide causal directions among the
variables. But there may be other factors such as the ones that are non-causally related
with both the treatment and the outcome, for e.g., those with associations. It seems that
some researchers tend to use them for conditioning too, for e.g., including them in the
propensity score model assuming that it removes the bias due to them. However gener-
ally, the causal graphical modelers do not consider them as confounders. Recently there
was a debate (see [5] [6], [7] and [8]) on this issue; if it is necessary to condition on a
variable that is not causally related with both the treatment and the outcome but associ-
ated with both. In the debate, Rubin argues for and Pearl and his colleagues argue against
saying that it will only introduce extra bias. Our goal here is to analyze these arguments
a little more deeper and to understand when we should condition on them. We use graph-
ical modeling framework to estimate causal effects therefore, we begin by giving some
details of it. We argue that in some cases, it is desirable to condition whereas in others,
it is not. Mostly the decision should be taken considering strengths of associations of the
potential confounder with the treatment and the outcome.
2. Covariate Selection for Adjustment of Confounding
We use concept of intervention in causal graphical models (also called do-calculus) de-
scribed in [2] and [9] for the causal effect estimation. This approach is equivalent to
the potential outcome model (see Ch. 7 of [2] and [10]). To recall the reader with this
calculus, first define the probability distribution of a random variable with conditioning
by intervention or action on another variable. For an observed random data sample on a
vector of random variables, say, X = (X1, ...,Xn), we can find the joint probability dis-
tribution of them, say, p(X = x) = p(x). We can have a factorization of p(x); let it be
p(x) = ∏ni p(xi|pai) where PAi ⊆ {X1, ...,Xi−1} with the exception of PA1 = /0 (empty
set) using some conditional independence assumptions within X. Note that here we de-
note random variables (or sets of them) by uppercase letters/expressions (such as X ,PA,
etc.) and their values by relevant lowercase expressions (x, pa, respectively). For a causal
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Figure 1. Two Bayesian network causal models
structure on X one can use, for e.g., time order of happening to index the variables such
that cause variables have higher indices than those of effect variables’. For any i, such
that 2 ≤ i ≤ n if p(xi|pai) 6= p(xi) then the probability distribution of vector of random
variables without Xi, say, X−i = {X1, ...,Xn}\{Xi} when Xi is intervened to a particular
value of it, say, xi, written as do(Xi = xi), denoted by p(x−i|do(Xi = xi)) is defined as
follows;
p(x−i|do(Xi = xi)) =
p(x)
p(xi|pai)
=
n
∏
k=1:k 6=i
p(xk|pak)
6=
p(x)
p(xi)
=
1
p(xi)
n
∏
k=1
p(xk|pak) = p(x−i|xi)
where the last expression is corresponding conditional probability distribution when we
have observed Xi = xi. That is, generally two probability distributions differ.
Now, consider two different causal relationships between X , Y and Z: the first
one is such that X is a cause of both Z and Y , and Z is a cause of Y which is rep-
resented as causal network model p(y,z,x) = p(x)p(z|x)p(y|x,z) shown by left hand
side diagram and the second one is such that X and Z are causes of Y which is rep-
resented as a causal network model p(y,z,x) = p(x)p(z)p(y|x,z) shown by right hand
side diagram in the Figure 1. And if we intervene on Z as do(Z = z) for z = 0,1,
then marginal intervention distribution of Y for the first causal model is p(y|do(Z =
z)) =∑x p(x)p(z|x)p(y|z,x)/p(z|x) =∑x p(y|z,x)p(x) whereas that for the second causal
model is p(y|do(Z = z)) = ∑x p(x)p(z)p(y|z,x)/p(z) = ∑x p(y|z,x)p(x) = p(y|z), since
X⊥Z in latter case. And the causal effect of the treatment option Z = z1 compared to
the control option Z = z0 is defined as ∑y yp(y|do(Z = z1))−∑y yp(y|do(Z = z0)). It is
identifiable if ∑x p(y|z,x)p(x) is a valid functional for z = z0,z1. Then we see that the
estimates for the two cases are different.
The above observation can be shown for a more general causal model. Let X =
(X1, ...,Xn) be according to time order and X0 represent a set variables that causally
affect Xp but we are not sure about chronological order of the elements of X0 with Xi
for 1 ≤ i< p ≤ n. Let parents (causes) of X j in X be PA j and that in (X0,X) be PA
+
j , so
PA j = PA
+
j for j≤ p−1 and PA
+
p = PAp∪X0. Then, the joint probability distribution of
(X,X0) is p(x0,x) = p(x0)∏
n
j=1 p(x j|pa
+
j ) and the intervention (on Xi) distribution is
p(xp|do(Xi = xi)) = ∑
x0,x1,..xi−1,
xi+1,...,xp−1,
xp+1,...,xn
p(x0)
n
∏
j=1
j 6=i
p(x j|pa
+
j )
= ∑
x0,x1,..xi−1,
xi+1,...,xp−1
p(x0)
p−1
∏
j=1
j 6=i
p(x j|D j)p(xp|Dp,x0)
= ∑
x0,x1,..xi−1,
xi+1,...,xp−1
p(x0)p(x1, ..xi−1)p(xi+1, ....,xp|Di+1,x0)
= ∑
x0,pap
p(x0)p(pap\{xi})p(xp|pap,x0)
= ∑
x0,pap
p(xp|xi, pap\{xi},x0)p(pap\{xi},x0)
where D j = {X1, ...,X j−1} such that D1 = /0 and Xi ∈ PAp. This is of the form of
p(y|do(z)) = ∑x p(y|z,x)p(x) where Z and X affects Y directly and so is X on Z. If we
assume that some of the variables in X0 are associated with some of the variables in the
vector (X1, ...,Xi−1) or, causally related or associated with variables in (Xp+1, ...,Xn) then
the above result holds.
p(xp|do(Xi = xi)) = ∑
x0,pap
p(xp,xi, pap\{xi},x0)
p(xi, pap\{xi},x0)/p(pap\{xi},x0)
= ∑
x0,pap
p(xp,xi, pap\{xi},x0)
p(xi|pap\{xi},x0)
= ∑
x0,pap
p(xp,xi, pap\{xi},x0)
p(xi|pa
−
p )
= ∑
x0,pa
−
p
p(xp,xi, pa
−
p )
p(xi|pa
−
p )
= ∑
x0,pa
−
p
p(xp|xi, pa
−
p )p(pa
−
p )
where PA−p = PAp∩PAi. Again, this is in the form of p(y|do(z)) =∑x p(y|z,x)p(x)where
X represents all the direct causal variables common to both Z and Y . And above simpli-
fications show that we can select the confounding variable set as follows.
Proposition 1 Let X ′′ denote the set of all potential causal variables of Y except for Z
and let P(Y |Z,X ′′) = P(Y |Z,X ′) where X ′ is the smallest subset of X ′′ in some sense.
Then the smallest subset X of X ′ in a similar sense such that P(Z|X ′) = P(Z|X) is a
sufficient set of confounders for estimating P(Y |do(Z)).
Here the smallest subset A of X can be a set of variables whose sum of their configu-
rations is the smallest. This rule gives a simple way to select covariates for removing
confounding bias. We avoid the proof of this rule but it is clear from the above discus-
sion. Recall that the back-door criterion is known to be incomplete (see Ch. 11 of [2])
meaning that the criterion fails for some sets of covariates but adjusting for them is suf-
ficient for removing confounding bias. Above rule avoids inclusion of covariates such
as instrumental variables, especially for building propensity score models. In fact, in lit-
erature sufficient confounder set is selected such that, firstly each confounder in it is a
cause of the treatment, and then it is a cause of the outcome [11]. However, it should be
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Figure 2. Model 2 is obtained by extending Model 1
done in the other way round; a confounder should be predictive of the outcome first and
then it should also predictive of the treatment. Following this order we do not miss any
important confounders, since any confounder should be related to the outcome at the first
place. For e.g., consider a causal model for estimating causal effect of teacher’s instruc-
tional practice (Z) on student’s reading comprehension achievement (Y ) as discussed in
[12]. It is assumed that the teacher’s reading knowledge X is a causal confounder such
that it affects directly both Z and Y . Furthermore, it is assumed that the teacher’s pro-
fessional development in reading U affects directly to Z and X and the teacher’s gen-
eral knowledge (W ) affects directly to X and Y . The causal diagram is shown as Model
1 in Figure 2. Then it is easy to see that p(y|do(z)) = ∑x p(y|z,x)p(x). And if we be-
lieve that U and W are dependent, for e.g., through a common cause, then we get that
p(y|do(z)) = ∑x,w p(y|z,x,w)p(x,w) when Z 6 ⊥W , that is reasonable to assume.
3. Associative Confounders
There is a controversy among the research community about kinds of variables that
should be considered as confounders for including, especially in the propensity score
models in the potential outcome causal model, since therein the causal diagrams show-
ing the causal structure are often not used. In fact, initially the propensity score concept
came into light to describe the treatment allocation process [4], [3]. In the current prac-
tice some authors argue that all the variables related to outcome should be included in the
propensity score model [13] (there can be some redundancy then) whereas others argue
that all the variables related to both the treatment and the outcome should be included
[14]. However, the problems occur when one finds variables that have non-causal (as-
sociative) relationships with the treatment or the outcome. Researchers usually replace
any such association between two variables with a causal fork using so-called common
cause principle. This is to replace an association with causal relations [7]. Simply, the
principle says that a non-causal association between two variables can be replaced by a
third variable that is causally affecting the both. For e.g., such an association between
two variables X and Y with a model, say, M1 : X Y can be replaced by a model, say,
M2 : X ←U→Y where arrows indicate causal relations. Then,U is said to be a common
cause of X and Y . Note that we omit the possibility of having feedback causal relations.
Now, let we observe a covariate X that is non-causally associated with both Z andY ,
which is the topic of Rubin and Pearl debate. It can be assumed that the non-causal as-
sociation structures Z X Y , is embedded in the context and therefore, apply a causal
fork to each of the two associations separately. In fact, the argument of [7] and [6] is
based on applying two causal forks for the two non-causal associations, one for each,
thus making X a so-called M-collider [12]. Their model of discussion is the Model A in
Figure 3 but the argument is based on the model Z←U → X ←W → Y that is called an
M-structure due to its shape. HereU andW are taken to be independent. An example of
this model is given in [15]: measuring causal effect of low education (Z) on later diabetes
risk (Y ) where it is assumed that mother’s previous diabetes status (X) is an associative
covariate. A medical opinion is that family income during the childhood (U) is a cause
of X and Z, and mother’s genetic risk of diabetes (W ) is a cause of X and Y .
Though U and W can be independent, it is appropriate to think that it is a special
case and generally, there is some dependence between them. In fact, one can just assume
it but here we investigate how and when such cases arise and discuss which actions are
appropriate then. For Model B of Figure 3, we can write the joint probability distribu-
tion of all the variables as p(y,x,u,w,z) = p(u)p(w)p(x | u,w)p(z|u)p(y|z,w), so with
intervention Z = do(z), we get p(y,x,u,w|do(z)) = p(u)p(w)p(x|u,w)p(y|z,w). Then,
p(y|do(z)) = ∑
u,w,x
p(u)p(w)p(x|u,w)p(y|z,w) = ∑
w
p(w)p(y|z,w) = ∑
w
p(w|z)p(y|z,w)
= p(y|z) = ∑
x
p(y | z,x)p(x | z) 6= ∑
x
p(y | z,x)p(x)
if W⊥Z and, since Z 6 ⊥X . Note that we have W⊥Z whenever U⊥W . That is, the
true probability of Y when Z is intervened is different from that obtained by condi-
tioning on X . And ignoring X gives the true intervened probability. So, when assum-
ing U⊥W , conditioning on X may result in a biased causal effect estimate; above in-
equality shows that the biasness may have caused due to the dependence between X
and Z, since p(x) 6= p(x|z), i.e., when X and Z are weakly dependent the biasness is
small. Note that if an error is occurred in the estimate of p(y|do(z)) for z = 0,1 then it
may not necessarily result in an error of same magnitude in causal effect estimate that
is ∑y yp(y|do(Z = 1))−∑y yp(y|do(Z = 0)), i.e., two errors may result in a different er-
ror. Resultant error (bias) due to conditioning on X is ∑y,x yp(y|Z = 1,x)[p(x)− p(x|Z =
1)]−∑y,x yp(y|Z = 0,x)[p(x)− p(x|Z = 0)]. For simplicity, we concentrate on errors that
can occur in estimation of p(y|do(z)) for z = 0,1. Note that, above discussion is valid
when some of other confounders, say, X1 are present where X⊥X1. And in the above
analysis we made a strong assumption thatW⊥Z, but this may not sometimes be true in
reality. In the following section we show this possibility.
3.1. Dependence of X with Z and Y
It is natural to consider the cases whenW 6 ⊥Z then it may be that p(y|do(z)) 6= p(y|z)
even if U 6 ⊥W . However, since W is hidden it is unclear how to consider this case. In
fact, for Model B in Figure 3 we haveW⊥Z [16]. Let us assume the case that X and Y
are strongly dependent. We use a geometric figure that is used to visualize the Simpson’s
paradox [17] to explore this possibility. Let the association between Y and X be such
that p(x|y)< p(x|y′). Then, for some T we have that p(t ′|y)p(x|y, t ′)+ p(t|y)p(x|y, t)<
p(t ′|y′)p(x|y′, t ′)+ p(t|y′)p(x|y′, t). Note that there are infinitely many such T but they
can be artificial unless given somemeaningful interpretation, ideally to few of them. Now
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Figure 3. Model B is obtained by applying two separate causal forks to Model A
consider the case of p(x|y, t ′) < p(x|y, t). It is important to note that the value p(x | y)
dissects positive length p(x|y, t)− p(x|y, t ′) according to ratio p(t|y) : p(t ′|y);
{p(t | y)+ p(t ′ | y)}p(x | y) = p(t ′ | y)p(x | y, t ′)+ p(t | y)p(x | y, t)
p(t | y){p(x | y, t)− p(x | y)}= p(t ′ | y){p(x | y)− p(x | y, t ′)}
p(x | y)− p(x | y, t ′)
p(x | y, t)− p(x | y)
=
p(t | y)
p(t ′ | y)
Now if T is a common cause of X and Y association then we should have p(x|y, t) =
p(x|y′, t) = p(x|t) and p(x|y, t ′) = p(x|y′, t ′) = p(x|t ′). Therefore, in Figure 4 the con-
ditional probabilities in the former equality are vertically aligned, and so are those
in the latter. Then we have p(x|y′, t ′) < p(x|y′, t) and p(x|y′) dissects positive length
p(x|y′, t)− p(x|y′, t ′) according to ratio p(t|y′) : p(t ′|y′) and similarly for p(x|y, t ′) <
p(x|y, t) and p(x|y). In the Figure 4 those ratios are marked with braces. Since the selec-
tion of T is restricted by the strength of the dependence between X and Y , for a higher
value of it, we can have a higher dependence between Y and T . And if the strength of
the dependence between X and Y is characterized by p(y|x) then that between X and T
should be also higher. And the other case is similar, i.e., taking p(x|y, t ′)> p(x|y, t).
If T is W in our causal model in Figure 3, a common cause for the association
between X and Y , then the dependences between X andW , and Y andW can be strong
given that the dependence between X and Y is strong. Similarly, a strong association
between Z and X implies that those between Z andU , andU and X can be strong. With
similar arguments, these imply that U and W can be dependent. An alternative way to
see that U and W are not independent when the associations between X and Z, and X
and Y are strong is to use correlations. In [18] it is shown that for any three random
variables, say, A,B andC the correlation coefficients among them satisfy the relationship
ρ2AC + ρ
2
BC + ρ
2
AB ≤ 1+ 2ρACρBCρAB. If, for e.g., when ρXZ = 0.8 and ρXY = 0.7 then
we cannot haveU andW such that ρUW = 0. Therefore, when the dependences between
Z and X , and Y and X are strong it may be that the introduced two common causes for
those associations are dependent. Furthermore, there can be another possibility for these
two associations; both associations may be due one cause, i.e., bothU andW refer to the
same hidden variable (V in the Model C in Figure 5).
However, current studies are often done without considering these possibilities. But
some researchers have shown that conditioning on associated covariates introduces only
10 p(x|y′, t ′) p(x|y′, t)
p(x|y, t ′) p(x|y, t)
p(x|y′)
p(x|y)
{p(t|y′)} : {p(t ′|y′)}
{p(t|y)} : {p(t ′|y)}
Figure 4. A common cause variable T for the negative correlation between X and Y , p(x|y) < p(x|y′). For the
probabilities p and q where p+ q= 1 the expression {p}:{q} means that the lengths of two line segments on
which p and q appear are according to the ratio p : q.
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Figure 5. Common cause models
a small bias. Their claims may be due to these contexts. Sometimes it is advised [8]
to control for all the pretreatment covariates but the graphical causal model researchers
reject this idea. Therefore, in the next section we take a look at different possibilities of
associative covariates and try to understand when the biasness can be amplified.
3.2. Deciding on Conditioning
Consider the case of two dependent hidden causes, i.e., U 6 ⊥W (such as Model D in
Figure 5) where the dependence is causal or non-causal. Then,
p(y|do(z)) = ∑
u,w,x
p(u,w)p(x|u,w)p(y|z,w) = ∑
w
p(w)p(y|z,w) = ∑
w,x
p(x)p(w|x)p(y|w,z,x)
6= ∑
w,x
p(x)p(w|z,x)p(y|w,z,x) = ∑
x
p(y|z,x)p(x)
if p(w|x) 6= p(w|z,x) i.e.,W 6 ⊥Z|X , conditioning on X does not give the correct proba-
bility estimate that is ∑w p(y|z,w)p(w). And ignoring X also does not give the correct es-
timate, since then we get p(y|do(z)) = p(y|z) = ∑w p(y|z,w)p(w|z) 6= ∑w p(y|z,w)p(w),
i.e., we need to assume Z⊥W in order to have the correct probability for the case but
we know that Z 6 ⊥W , especially when associations between X and Y , and Z and Y are
strong. That is, to condition on X we should have W⊥Z|X and to ignore X we should
haveW⊥Z. So, the question remains is that which statement should be accepted in or-
der to be more correct against the other; eitherW⊥Z|X orW⊥Z. Accepting the former
(rejecting the latter) is to condition on X and vice versa. But none of the conditions can
be tested, since they involve unobservableW .
However, with some subject domain knowledge if one can assume meaningful U
andW and then recognize their dependences with X (based on those between Z and X ,
and Y and X) it may be possible to decide which option can be better. For e.g., if those
dependences are not strong and causation of U andW on X is mostly based on explain-
ing away phenomenon [19], then it may not be desirable to condition of X . Note that the
explaining away phenomenon is that when we see X = 1 then observing U = 1 makes
P(W = 1) lower and vice versa. If conditioned on X in this case, then comparative strata
of data sample in the causal effect calculation may have imbalances in the causal vari-
ablesU andW . This can cause biased causal effect estimates. And when the dependences
ofU andW with X is assumed to be high then it is less likely that there is an explaining
away phenomenon, i.e, most probably the causation is monotonic (when we see X = 1
then observingU = 1 makes P(W = 1) higher and vice versa) then conditioning on X can
be beneficial because it results in balances in the causal variablesU andW . Though one
can reason about the actions to be taken as done above, it requires extensive simulation
studies to confirm them.
Now consider the case of single hidden cause, say, V (Model C in Figure 5). Then
p(y|do(z)) = ∑
x,v
p(v)p(x|v)p(y|z,v) = ∑
v
p(y|z,v)p(v) = ∑
x,v
p(x)p(v|x)p(y|z,v,x)
6= ∑
x,v
p(x)p(v|z,x)p(y|z,v,x) = ∑
x
p(y|z,x)p(x).
Therefore, here also conditioning on X does not gives the correct probability estimate that
is ∑v p(y|z,v)p(v) if p(v|x) 6= p(v|z,x), i.e., V 6 ⊥Z|X . But ignoring X also does not give
the correct estimate as p(y|do(z)) 6= p(y|z) in this case. Since p(y|z) =∑v p(y|z,v)p(v|z),
ignoring X means assuming V⊥Z, but we know that Z and V should be dependent. So,
similar to the above case, the question remains is that which should be accepted against
the other in order to be more correct; either or V⊥Z|X or V⊥Z. Accepting the former is
to condition on X and vice versa. But similar to the above case where the dependences
are higher, assuming V⊥Z|X can be better than assuming V⊥Z, therefore conditioning
on X . If the subject domain knowledge shows that there is a single common causeV then
it is beneficial to condition on X .
4. Conclusion
Causal effect estimation tasks from observational data need to consider confounders of
the causal relation of interest for controlling for (conditioning on). However, it is not
necessary that all of them are considered but a ”sufficient” subset of them. Often the
current practice is to select them according to their predictive ability of the treatment
firstly and then the outcome. But it should be done other way round; firstly they should be
predictive of the outcome and then the treatment. And we show how to handle associative
confounders (those are not causing both the treatment and outcome but associated with
them) where currently there is no clear consensus about using them. It is often beneficial
to condition on associative confounders when they are strongly dependent with both the
treatment and outcome whereas it is not so for weakly dependent ones.
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